The Supreme Court of Georgia recently held a Husband to the exact language in his divorce decree, even though it may cause him hardship. Greenwood v. Greenwood, S11A0611 (2011). In that case, the parties’ final judgment and decree of divorce awarded the marital residence to the Husband, and required him to “timely refinance the marital residence…so as to completely remove the Wife from any liability relating to the underlying mortgage.” Id. If the Husband did not refinance the mortgage by the deadline, he was required to immediately pay $10,000 to the Wife as a penalty. Id. at 2. After the Husband failed to refinance the mortgage and/or pay the penalty, the Wife filed a motion for contempt. Id. The trial court found the Husband in contempt, but converted the monetary penalty into a lien against the marital residence and stated in its order that, due to current market conditions, it would give the Husband a reasonable time to sell the house to remove Wife from the mortgage. Id. at 3.
The Wife appealed, alleging that the trial court improperly modified the divorce decree, and the Supreme Court of Georgia agreed. In general, “[w]hile the trial court has broad discretion to determine whether [a divorce] decree has been violated and has authority to interpret and clarify the decree, it does not have the power in a contempt proceeding to modify the terms of the…decree.” Id. at 4; quoting Dohn v. Dohn, 276 Ga. 826 (2003). Here, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that it was “clear that the trial court improperly modified the divorce decree by converting Husband’s penalty for failure to remove Wife from the mortgage by an explicitly-stated deadline into a lien on the marital residence.” Id. at 4. A lien “that may possibly be recouped at some indeterminate time in the future” is contrary to a monetary penalty which became due on October 2, 2009 and, thus, the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed this portion of the order. Id. at 5. Though the Court was sympathetic to the hardship the market may place on Husband, allowing him a reasonable time to sell was also an impermissible modification of the divorce decree. Id. at 6.