The Supreme Court of Georgia recently heard a case dealing with supervised visitation that was to be phased out through a transition period. In Sigal v. Sigal, before filing for divorce, the mother first filed a petition for separate maintenance. Sigal v. Sigal, S11F0835 (2011). In the decree from that case, the mother was granted primary custody and the father’s visitation was required to be supervised as a result of his documented drug and alcohol abuse problems. Id. at 2. The mother subsequently filed for divorce and “asserted that all issues regarding custody, visitation and support of the children were fully adjudicated in the decree of separate maintenance.” Id. The father disagreed and sought “reasonable and fair unsupervised visitation” with the children. Id. After hearing testimony from both parties, the trial court orally announced its ruling, holding that the father could have unsupervised visitation provided that he took and passed a drug test within the next 45 days and provided that the unsupervised visitation be phased in over a three month transition period. Id. at 3-4.
For reasons unknown, the final divorce decree was not entered for several months, though the visitation provision was entered nunc pro tunc from the date of the hearing. (This means that the visitation provision went into effect as of the date of the hearing, rather than the date of the final divorce decree). Id. at 4-5. As a result, the three-month transition period had already expired by the time the final decree was entered. Id.
For this reason, the mother appealed, and the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court’s ruling. The Court held that “the nunc pro tunc action as to the gradual transition provision in the decree here did not serve to conform the decree to the truth or the justice of the situation as originally intended by the trial court.” Id. at 7. “Rather, it had the exact opposite effect by eliminating the truth and justice recognized by the trial court…regarding the need of these children for a gradual transition period from supervised to unsupervised visitation with their father.” Id. at 7-8. For this reason, the trial court abused its discretion in making the visitation provision nunc pro tunc.